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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD DRAUGHON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE 
SOCIETY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 870174 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the 
Court by Utah Code Anno. § 78-2-2(3)(i)(1986). 
The pertinent proceedings below include only the 
parties' cross motions for summary judgment heard before the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on March 31, 1987. Judge 
Cornaby took the Motions under advisement and entered a 
written ruling on April 9, 1987, granting defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and denying plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
I. Whether Judge Cornaby erred in not finding the 
meaning of the phrase "material contributing cause" 
ambiguous. 
II. Whether Judge Cornaby erred in applying an 
1 
Oregon judicial interpretation of the phrase 
"material contributing cause" to the facts of the 
case. 
III. Whether, if the Oregon judicial 
interpretation is applicable, Judge Cornaby erred 
in his construction and application of that 
interpretation. 
IV. Whether Judge Cornaby erred in concluding 
that, as a matter of law, Sandra Draughon's kidney 
disease was a "material contributing cause" of her 
death. 
V. Whether Judge Cornaby erred in effectively 
rewriting the contract of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In October of 1985, Ronald Draughon and his wife, Sandra 
Draughon, entered into a loan agreement under which they 
borrowed funds from America First Credit Union to purchase an 
automobile. Pursuant to the loan agreement, America First 
Credit Union obtained credit life insurance from defendant 
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society ("CUNA") for the benefit of Mr. 
and Mrs. Draughon. 
Mrs. Draughon suffered from kidney disease first 
diagnosed in 1982. Although her condition was successfully 
treated with maintenance hemodialysis, in November of 1985 
2 
Mrs. Draughon elected to undergo a kidney transplant 
operation. The operation was successfully performed on 
November 21, 1985. 
Mrs. Draughon soon developed acute pancreatitis, a rare 
and unforeseen complication of the immunosuppressive 
treatment she received following the operation. The 
pancreatitis caused internal abdominal infections and, 
eventually, cardiac arrest leading to Mrs. Draughon's death. 
A claim was submitted to CUNA and denied based on CUNA's 
assertion that Mrs. Draughon's death came under the "risks 
not assumed" clause. Disputing CUNA's reading of the clause, 
on June 13, 1986, Mr. Draughon filed suit in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Davis County seeking a judgment 
construing the "risks not assumed" clause in his favor and 
requiring CUNA to pay the claim submitted. 
On March 31, 1987, both Mr. Draughon and CUNA brought 
summary judgment motions for hearing before the Honorable 
Douglas L. Cornaby. In a written Ruling dated April 9, 1987, 
Judge Cornaby denied Mr. Draughon's Motion and granted CUNA's 
Motion concluding that no issues of material fact existed, 
that the phrase "material contributing cause" should be 
interpreted in accordance with a 1986 Court of Appeals of 
Oregon case, that in light of this interpretation Mrs. 
Draughon#s kidney disease was a "material contributing cause" 
3 
of her death and that, therefore, Mr. Draughon's claim was 
properly denied. Judgment in favor of defendant was entered 
on May 5, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 29, 1985, plaintiff Ron Draughon and 
his wife Sandra Draughon entered into a loan agreement under 
which they borrowed funds to purchase an automobile through 
America First Credit Union of Ogden.1 As part of the 
transaction, America First Credit Union obtained credit life 
insurance from defendant CUNA for the benefit of Mr. and Mrs. 
Draughon.2 Subject to certain conditions and exclusions, the 
credit life insurance contract obligated CUNA to pay the 
balance due on the auto loan in the event of Mr. or Mrs. 
Draughon's death. 
Mrs. Draughon suffered from kidney disease first 
diagnosed in September of 1982. Her condition was 
successfully treated with maintenance hemodialysis, and she 
led a normal, productive life.3 She maintained full 
employment while raising two young children. Continuing the 
hemodialysis treatments, she was expected to live another 
1
 Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 1 (R. 87). 
3
 Id. 
4 
twenty to thirty years.4 
In November of 1985, Mrs. Draughon elected to undergo a 
kidney transplant operation. The operation was successfully 
performed on November 21, 1985.5 Soon thereafter, Mrs. 
Draughon developed acute pancreatitis, a rare and unforeseen 
complication of the immunosuppressive drugs she was given to 
help prevent rejection of the transplanted organ.6 The 
immunosuppressive drugs caused inflammation and hemorrhaging 
of the pancreas which led to internal abdominal infection, 
cardiac arrest and Mrs. Draughon's death on February 7, 
1986.7 As stated by her physician Dr. Wayne Border, "in no 
sense was the cause of [her] death related to her underlying 
renal [kidney] disease."8 
Soon after Mrs. Draughon's death, Mr. Draughon submitted 
the claim under the credit life insurance contract. CUNA 
denied the claim based on its assertion that the "risks not 
assumed" clause of the contract applied to Mrs. Draughon's 
4
 Deposition Transcript of Wayne A. Border, M.D. at 31. 
5
 Affidavit of Dr. Wayne A. Border % 6 (R. 16). 
6
 Deposition Transcript of Wayne A. Border, M.D. at 28. 
7
 Id. at 27. 
8
 Deposition Transcript of Wayne A. Border, M.D., 
Deposition Exhibit 2, at 2. 
5 
death.9 In relevant part, the clause reads: 
CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and 
no benefit is provided for any loss if 
any material contributing cause of loss 
was from sickness or injury which first 
became manifest prior to the time 
insurance coverage was otherwise 
effective under the contract.10 
Specifically, CUNA contended that Mrs. Draughon's kidney 
disease, admittedly manifest prior to the effective date of 
the contract, was a "material contributing cause" of her 
death. 
Prior to Judge Cornaby's April 9, 1987 Ruling disposing 
of this matter, the meaning of the phrase "material 
contributing cause" was addressed by no Court other than the 
Courts of the State of Oregon. In Oregon, the phrase is 
applied in a specific factual context common to certain 
workers compensation disputes. The phrase is not defined in 
the insurance contract in which it is found and Judge Cornaby 
did not define it in his April 9 Ruling. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Resolution of this matter involved two tasks: 
interpretation of the phrase "material contributing cause," 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the phrase") and 
application of that interpretation to the facts. In carrying 
9
 Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (R« 88). 
10 Id. 
6 
out these tasks, Judge Cornaby erred in several respects. 
First, the phrase is not defined in the insurance 
contract, has no ordinary meaning and lacks a relevant 
judicial interpretation. Therefore, it should have been 
found ambiguous and construed strictly against CUNA. Mr. 
Draughon presented a construction favorable to his position 
and urged Judge Cornaby to adopt it. Judge Cornaby erred in 
failing to do so. 
Second, the only judicial interpretation of the phrase, 
that of the courts of Oregon, was developed and is applied in 
a legal and factual context incompatible with those of the 
present matter. For that reason, and because the parties did 
not intend to be bound by the Oregon interpretation, it is 
inapplicable. Judge Cornaby's reliance on the Oregon 
interpretation was, therefore, error. 
Finally, assuming the applicability of the Oregon 
interpretation, Mrs. Draughon#s kidney disease was not a 
"material contributing cause" of her death under that 
interpretation. In reaching the opposite result, Judge 
Cornaby overlooked the key element of proof required by the 
Oregon courts to establish "material contributing cause," a 
medical causal link between the original and subsequent 
injuries. Therefore, although ostensibly applying the Oregon 
interpretation of the phrase, Judge Cornaby misconstrued that 
7 
interpretation and, in doing so, committed error. 
ARGUMENT 
The review standard applicable to this appeal was set 
forth in Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc., v. Service 
Auto Parts. Inc.. 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). In Automotive 
Manufacturers the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of plaintiff based on its interpretation of certain 
language found in a security agreement. Defendant assigned 
error to the trial court's interpretation. Upon review, this 
court stated: 
The narrow question we are called upon to 
answer is whether by co-signing a 
security agreement with the provisions as 
indicated supra, one becomes a guarantor 
of the principle. We must, therefore, 
interpret the language of the documents 
drafted by plaintiff and signed by the 
parties in 197 2. Where the issue 
involved is solely one of law, as in the 
instant case, this court is capable of 
determining the question as was the trial 
court and we are not bound by its 
conclusions. 
Id. at 1036. 
Likewise, the central issue involved in this appeal is 
solely one of law. The court must interpret the language of 
an insurance policy drafted by CUNA. Judge Cornaby's 
conclusions are not binding and, as argued below, should be 
given no deference. 
8 
POINT I 
THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF 
THE PHRASE "MATERIAL 
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" EMPLOYS 
PROXIMATE CAUSE PRINCIPLES. 
Resolution of this matter involves, first, the 
interpretation of the phrase "material contributing cause." 
The phrase appears in an exclusionary clause of the insurance 
contract of the parties. As noted above, the clause reads: 
CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and 
no benefit is provided for any loss if 
any material contributing cause of loss 
was from sickness or injury which first 
became manifest prior to the time 
insurance coverage was otherwise 
effective under the contract.11 
In rejecting Mr. Draughon's claim, CUNA stated that Mrs. 
Draughon's kidney disease, first manifest prior to coverage, 
was a "material contributing cause" of her death. 
A« The Phrase Should be Defined Employing Proximate Cause 
Principles. 
Mr. Draughon argued below, and urges on appeal, that the 
phrase "material contributing cause" should be interpreted 
and applied employing proximate cause principles. Several 
reasons exist for equating "material contributing cause" with 
proximate cause. First, the only judicial interpretations of 
the phrase "material contributing cause," those of the courts 
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (R. 88). 
of Oregon, define and apply it employing terminology and 
concepts borrowed from the doctrine of proximate cause.12 
Second, the doctrine is the standard for determining cause 
most familiar to the judiciary. Finally, the use of 
proximate cause as the equivalent of "material contributing 
cause" will allow this court to apply the objective, 
conceptual parameters it developed to determine proximate 
cause. Use of the "material contributing cause" standard 
will suffer from the lack of such an objective, conceptual 
basis for decision. 
B. Equating "Material Contributing Cause" with Proximate 
Cause. Kidney Disease was not a "Material Contributing 
Cause" of Mrs. Draughon/s Death. 
To restate, the central issue is whether Mrs. Draughon's 
kidney disease, her only sickness or injury manifest prior to 
coverage, was a "material contributing cause" of her death. 
Employing proximate cause principles, the issue becomes 
whether Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was a cause "which in 
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause, produces [her death] and without which the 
1 2
 In the context of worker's compensation claims, an 
older, compensated injury is a "material contributing cause" 
of a present condition only if there is no "intervening and 
superceding cause of [the present] condition." Manous v. 
Argonaut Insurance. 79 Or. App. 645, 719 P.2d 1318, 1320 
(1986). See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment against CUNA Mutual Insurance Society at 4 (R.21). 
10 
result would not have occur red •"."13 Examining each part of 
the test individually, it is apparent that the issue should 
be decided in favor of Mr. Draughon. 
First, to be a proximate cause (and by interpretation, a 
"material contributing cause"), Mrs. Draughon's kidney 
disease must have produced her death in a natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening 
cause. The sequence of events that actually occurred from 
the time Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was first diagnosed 
until her death were not natural, continuous or unbroken. 
Whether one defines "natural" in terms of probability or in 
terms of foreseeability, the pancreatitis that caused Mrs. 
Draughon's death was not a part of the "natural" sequence 
because, as both the doctors for Mr. Draughon and CUNA agree, 
it was an improbable, not reasonably foreseeable complication 
of her transplantation.14 
That the sequence of events was not "continuous" but was 
in fact "broken" is apparent. The prognosis for Mrs. 
Draughon's kidney disease prior to her election to undergo a 
transplantation was good. Continuing her hemodialysis 
treatments, she was expected to live another twenty to thirty 
13
 Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245 
(Utah 1985). 
1 4
 See Affidavit of Dr. Wayne A. Border at 2 (R.16), 
and Affidavit of Dr. Robert E. Bond at 2 (R.49). 
11 
years. 1 5 Mrs. Draughon's election to undergo a 
transplantation not only interrupted but completely ended the 
natural and continuous progression of her kidney disease. 
Finally, an efficient intervening cause, in fact that 
the sole cause, as agreed by both doctors for Mr. Draughon 
and CUNA, broke any " chain of causation77 that may have 
existed. The efficient cause is "one that necessarily sets 
in operation the factors that accomplish the injury."16 Dr. 
Border, Mrs. Draughon7 s physician, explained how her 
pancreatitis developed and set in operation the factors that 
led to her death: 
In my view the initial event would have 
been the damage to the pancreas by the 
steroid, the prednisone drug she was 
taking, and that caused pancreatitis; 
that is, inflammation of the pancreas; 
the pancreas cells now begin to leak 
their contents, which are enzymes, which 
are like acid, they begin to eat other 
tissues, and the pancreas literally 
begins to dissolve itself, and that7s the 
condition we call acute pancreatitis that 
is associated with nausea, vomiting, back 
pain and other conditions. 
Now, that can be reversible, or if it 
progresses, as in her case, the release 
of these harmful substances from the 
pancreas continues to literally dissolve 
the pancreas and then begins to erode 
through these tissues, and then it begins 
31. 
1 5
 Deposition transcript of Wayne A. Border, M.D., at 
1 6
 Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d at 245. 
12 
to hemorrhage, so that suddenly the whole 
pancreas has turned into a huge area of 
dead and hemorrhagic tissues, and now 
that becomes infected so that we now are 
back--we've now gone back to the 
infections that she has. 
The retroperitoneal hemorrhage is the 
dissection of the blood and the 
pancreatic contents into other parts of 
the back; the areas surrounding the 
pancreas; and now you have a life 
threatening condition, and the—obviously 
the low blood pressure and the metabolic 
acidosis are all terminal events 
resulting in cardiac arrest.17 
Dr. Border's description of the terminal sequence of 
events makes apparent that the efficient cause of Mrs. 
Draughon's death was her pancreatitis. Therefore, Mrs. 
Draughon's kidney disease cannot be termed a proximate cause 
of her death. Instead, it is an event that Couch on 
Insurance refers to as an "antecedent contributing 
circumstance." Section 74.717 states: 
An antecedent contributing circumstance 
is generally ignored in determining the 
proximate cause. That is to say, a 
situation which merely sets the stage for 
the later event is not regarded as being 
the proximate cause merely because it 
made possible the subsequent loss. For 
example, the explosion of gas, and not 
the lighting of a match, is the proximate 
cause of loss where the explosion is 
caused by the lightinq of a match in a 
room filled with gas.18^ 
Deposition transcript of Dr. Wayne A. Border at 31. 
Couch on Insurance 2d at 1024 (Rev. ed.). 
13 
Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease and transplantation were 
events or circumstances that "merely set the stage" for the 
later terminal events identified by Dr. Border. The kidney 
disease in particular, the only "sickness or injury which 
first became manifest prior to the time insurance coverage 
was otherwise effective under the contract,"19 was not a 
proximate cause and, by interpretation, not a "material 
contributing cause" of her death. Plaintiff assigns error to 
Judge Cornaby's failure to so hold. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE 
"MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE." 
Resolution of the ultimate issue below, whether Sandra 
Draughon/s kidney disease was a "material contributing cause" 
of her death, required Judge Cornaby to first define the 
phrase "material contributing cause." The difficulty of this 
task was compounded by three factors: the phrase is not 
defined in the insurance contract in which it appears, it has 
no "usual and ordinarily accepted meaning"20 and it is not 
defined in any relevant case law. 
Despite these factors, Judge Cornaby did not find the 
1 9
 Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (R. 88). 
2 0
 Beraera v. Ideal National Life Insurance Co. , 524 
P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1974). 
14 
phrase ambiguous. Instead, he looked to the judicial 
interpretation given the phrase by the courts of the State of 
Oregon, determined that that interpretation is relevant and 
applied the interpretation to the facts of this case.21 In 
doing so, he committed two errors. First, he erred in not 
finding the phrase ambiguous at the outset. Second, he erred 
in his determination that the Oregon interpretation is 
relevant and applicable. 
A. "Material Contributing Cause." as a Phrase, is 
Inherently Ambiguous. 
In Auto Leasing Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 
7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958), this court established 
the following as the test for ambiguity in an insurance 
policy provision: 
The test to be applied is: would the 
meaning be plain to a person of ordinary 
intelligence and understanding, viewing 
the matter fairly and reasonably, in 
accordance with the usual and natural 
meaning of the words, and in light of the 
existing circumstances, including the 
purpose of the policy.22 
As applied to the phrase at issue, the test indicates 
ambiguity for several reasons. First, because "reasonable 
2 1
 Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3 (R. 88-
89) . 
2 2
 Auto Leasing Company v. Central Mutual Insurance 
Co., 325 P.2d at 266. 
15 
minds may differ as to the meaning"23 of the phrase, by 
definition its meaning cannot be "plain to a person of 
ordinary intelligence," The problem stems from the use of 
the word "material." Webster's Dictionary defines "material" 
as "having real importance or great consequences."24 
Applying this definition, one notes that the phrase embodies 
a subjective value determination. The question becomes 
whether Sandra Draughon's kidney disease was an "important" 
contributing cause of her death, a question on which 
reasonable minds may differ. 
For example, one might argue, as does Mr. Draughon, that 
Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was not an important 
contributing cause of her death because there is no medical 
causal connection between her kidney disease and her death. 
On the other hand, one might argue, as does CUNA, that Mrs. 
Draughon's kidney disease was an important contributing cause 
of her death because but for her kidney disease she would not 
have experienced the events that led to her death. In other 
words, the meaning of the phrase and its application to the 
facts is dependent on the subjective determination of 
importance made by the person analyzing the issue. It is 
this subjective element that prevents the meaning of the 
2 3
 Id. 
2 4
 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (5th Ed. 1977). 
16 
phrase from being "plain" to the hypothetical, objective 
"person of ordinary intelligence."25 
In addition, the unqualified use of the word "cause" 
complicates the meaning of the phrase. Webster's Dictionary 
defines "cause" as "something that brings about a result."26 
In the context of the insurance contract, the use of the word 
without qualification raises the question of whether "cause" 
means anything that brings about a result or whether it 
refers only to medical or physiological factors that bring 
about a result. Arguably, the language of the exclusionary 
provision contemplates that "cause" includes only medical 
factors.27 That there is room for argument, however, points 
out the ambiguous nature of the phrase and the futility of 
trying to determine its "plain" meaning. 
In short, the Auto Leasing Company test exposes the 
2 5
 Aside from the additional ambiguity the subjective 
element supplies, it is objectionable because coverage under 
the insurance contract should not depend on defendant's 
subjective determination of materiality. Finding the phrase 
ambiguous and construing it in favor of plaintiff should 
cause defendant to rewrite its exclusionary provision to 
provide objective parameters within which claims such as 
plaintiff's can be properly assessed. 
2 6
 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (5th Ed. 1977). 
2 7
 The exclusionary provision provides: "No benefit is 
provided for any loss if any material contributing cause of 
loss was from sickness or injury which first became manifest 
. . . ." See Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (R. 
88). 
17 
essential ambiguity of the phrase at issue. A reasonable, 
objective person of ordinary intelligence would not say that 
its meaning is "plain." Accordingly, the phrase should have 
been construed strictly against the insurer, CUNA. As stated 
by this Court: 
In interpreting insurance policies, we 
have held that ambiguities are to be 
construed against the insurer and that 
words are to be given their ordinary 
meaning. An insured is entitled to the 
broadest protection he could have 
reasonably understood to be provided by 
the policy.28 
Judge Cornaby erred in failing to recognize the aiabiguity and 
construe the phrase against CUNA. 
B. The Oregon Interpretation of the Phrase is Inapplicable. 
Judge Cornaby ostensibly applied a Court of Appeals of 
Oregon interpretation of the phrase to arrive at his decision 
in the present matter.29 Application of this interpretation 
is erroneous for two reasons. First, the Oregon 
interpretation is irrelevant in the present context.. The 
Oregon courts have developed the phrase and its body of 
defining principles as a judicial elucidation of certain 
z
*> Fuller v. Director of Finance. 694 P.2d 1045 (Utah 
1985). 
2 9
 See Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (Re 
88) . 
18 
language found in an Oregon workers' compensation statute.JU 
The Oregon interpretation, therefore, is colored by the 
statutory context in which it developed and the peculiar 
facts of the workers' compensation claims in which it arose. 
Specifically, the phrase is applied by the Oregon Courts 
only when a certain set of facts give rise to a claim under 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.273(1).31 Those facts are: (1) a 
claimant has suffered an off-the-job injury (2) that operates 
to aggravate an earlier, compensated on-the-job injury (3) to 
the same part of the body.32 When these particular facts are 
present, the issue is whether the earlier, compensated injury 
is a "material contributing cause" of the aggravation.33 
Even assuming the relevancy of the Oregon interpretation 
in an abstract sense, the facts of this case do not fit the 
pattern that triggers the Oregon application of the phrase. 
3 0
 See Taafe v. SAIF, 77 Or. App. 492, 713 P.2d 680 
(1986); Grable v. Weyerhauser Co., 291 Or. 387, 631 P.2d 768 
(1981); Peterson v. Eugene F. Burrill Lumber, 294 Or. 537, 
660 P.2d 1058 (1983). The relevant statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 
656.273(1), provides: "After the last award or arrangement 
of compensation, an injured worker is entitled to additional 
compensation, including medical services, for worsened 
conditions resulting from the original injury." 
3 1
 See Footnote 30. 
3 2
 See Grable, 291 Or. at 400-01, 631 P.2d at 776; also 
see Manous v. Argonaut Insurance, 79 Or. App. 645, 719 P.2d 
1318 (1986). 
3 3
 Id. 
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Mrs. Draughon's death did not result from an aggravation of 
her kidney disease, nor did it result from injury to the same 
part of the body as that injured by the kidney disease. In 
short, the Oregon interpretation of the phrase is 
inapplicable. 
Second, the application of the Oregon interpretation was 
erroneous because the parties did not intend that the phrase 
be given such an interpretation. In Union Pacific Railroad 
Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 
(1965), this court stated that "in resolving a dispute about 
the interpretation of provisions in a contract the objective 
is to determine what the parties intended at the time it was 
executed."34 Judge Cornaby failed to meet this objective. 
Instead, he used, without alteration or qualification, an 
interpretation of the phrase that neither party contemplated. 
In applying the contextually incongruous Oregon 
interpretation, and in doing so without consideration for the 
intentions of the parties, Judge Cornaby committed error. 
3 4
 Union Pacific Railroad Co. , v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Co.. 408 P.2d at 913. 
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POINT III 
IF THE OREGON INTERPRETATION OF 
THE P H R A S E " MATERIAL 
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" IS PROPERLY 
CONSTRUED AND APPLIED TO THE 
PRESENT FACTS, MRS. DRAUGHON'S 
KIDNEY DISEASE WAS NOT A 
"MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" 
OF HER DEATH. 
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the Oregon 
interpretation, if properly construed and applied it would 
have yielded a result in favor of Mr. Draughon. Simply put, 
this is because under the Oregon interpretation proof of 
"material contributing cause" requires proof of medical 
cause, and there is no evidence of a medical causal 
connection between Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease and her 
death. 
The causal connection that does exist, a simple "but 
for" relation, served as a basis for Judge Cornaby's ruling 
that Mrs. Draughon 's kidney disease was a "material 
contributing cause" of her death. Therefore, although 
ostensibly applying the Oregon interpretation, Judge Cornaby 
reached a result opposite of what should have been reached 
under that interpretation. 
Judge Cornaby's analysis of the Oregon interpretation of 
the phrase, and his application of that interpretation to the 
facts of the case consists entirely of the following: 
This phrase has not been interpreted by a 
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Utah court before and there is little 
precedent in other jurisdictions on this 
exact issue. The Appeals Court of Oregon 
addressed the issue in Manous vs. 
Argonaut Insurance, 79 Or. App. 645, 719 
P.2d 1318 (1986). This case interpreted 
the phrase "material contributing cause" 
in light of Oregon's workmen's 
compensation law. Under this law, the 
employee has the burden of proving that 
an original injury is a "material 
contributing cause" of a present 
compensable injury. The court stated 
that "a compensable injury need not be 
the sole or principle cause of clciimant's 
worsened condition," it need only be a 
material cause. id. at 1320. Although 
other intervening forces act upon the 
original condition, the original 
condition is a material contributing 
factor of the final injury. 
Applying this interpretation to the 
present facts, kidney disease was a 
"material contributing cause" of Mrs. 
Draughon's death. If not for her kidney 
disease, Mrs. Draughon would not have 
elected to undergo a kidney transplant. 
If she had not had the kidney transplant, 
she would not have been given steroid 
drugs which caused acute pancreatitis, 
which ultimately caused her death. The 
original condition was kidney disease, 
which was a material factor in causing 
her death.35 
This "but for" causation analysis amounts to a 
misconstruction and misapplication of the Oregon 
interpretation of the phrase. Both the misconstruction and 
misapplication were prejudicial to plaintiff's case because 
3 5
 Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3 (R. 88-
89) . 
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they served as the basis upon which Judge Cornaby ruled 
against plaintiff.36 
A. Oregon Interpretation. 
The essential feature of the Oregon interpretation of 
the phrase overlooked by Judge Cornaby is that under the 
Oregon interpretation, satisfaction of the causation element 
requires proof of medical cause. In other words, an 
original, compensated injury can only be a "material 
contributing cause" of a subsequent off-the-job injury if a 
medical causal connection exists between the two. Thus, in 
Christensen v. State Accident Insurance Fund. 27 Or. App. 
595, 557 P.2d 48 (1976), the court stated: "The issue in 
cases involving the range of compensable consequences flowing 
from a primary injury is nearly exclusively the medical issue 
of causal connection between the primary injury and the 
subsequent medical complications."37 
This feature of the Oregon interpretation is illustrated 
by the Oregon courts' reliance on medical testimony to 
3 6
 Id. at 3 (R. 89). 
3 7
 Id. at 50. Note that in Grable v. Weverhauser. 291 
Or. 387, 631 P.2d 768 (1981), one party argued that because 
the Christensen court did not use the phrase "material 
contributing cause" in its decision, it had adopted a rule of 
law that conflicted with earlier cases applying the "material 
contributing cause" standard. In dismissing the argument, 
the Grable court explained the apparent inconsistency and 
showed that, in effect, the Christensen court did apply the 
"material contributing cause" standard. 631 P.2d at 776. 
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establish ''material contributing cause." For example, in 
Coddinaton v. SAIF. 68 Or. App. 439, 681 P.2d 799 (1984), the 
court concluded with the following statement: "We find from 
the medical testimony that the January/ 1981, incident was a 
material contributing cause of the herniation."38 Likewise, 
the court in Christensen concluded: "We think that in this 
case the claimant has produced the requisite medical evidence 
sufficient to establish the causal connection between his 
present condition and the 1972 injury."39 It is the medical 
causal connection, shown through evidence of physiological 
cause and effect, that establishes "material contributing 
cause" under the Oregon interpretation. 
Likewise, the lack of a medical causal connection, shown 
through evidence of no physiological cause and effect, 
requires a finding of no "material contributing cause" under 
the Oregon interpretation. Thus, as noted above, Dr. Border 
identified the administration of steroid drugs as the first 
link in the physiological chain of causation leading to Mrs. 
Draughon's death.40 The kidney disease and transplantation 
were events or circumstances that set the stage for the later 
3 8
 681 P.2d at 802. 
3 9
 557 P.2d at 50; See also Manous, 79 Or. App. 645, 
719 P.2d 1318 (1986). 
4 0
 See argument at 12, supra. 
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terminal events, but otherwise lack a causal connection to 
those events. Accordingly, under the Oregon interpretation 
of the phrase, the interpretation ostensibly applied by Judge 
Cornaby, Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was not a "material 
contributing cause" of her death. 
B. Judge Cornaby#s Construction and Application. 
In his construction and application of the Oregon 
interpretation of the phrase, Judge Cornaby failed to 
recognize the medical causation element. According to Judge 
Cornaby, Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was a "material 
contributing cause" of her death because of the following 
"but for" causation sequence: 
If not for her kidney disease, Mrs. 
Draughon would not have elected to 
undergo a kidney transplant. If she had 
not had the kidney transplant, she would 
not have been given steroid drugs which 
caused acute pancreatitis, which 
ultimately caused her death.41 
According to the Oregon interpretation, the first two 
events of the sequence noted by Judge Cornaby could not be 
material contributing causes of death because they lack the 
necessary causal connection. Taking the parts of the 
sequence one at a time, Judge Cornaby first states: "If not 
4 1
 Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 (R. 89) . 
Interestingly, only upon reaching the third "link" in his 
sequence - "steroid drugs which caused acute pancreatitis"-
does Judge Cornaby begin to use the word "cause" in his 
description of the sequence. 
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for her kidney disease, Mrs. Draughon would not have elected 
to undergo a kidney transplant.//42 There is no medically 
indicated causal connection, no physiological cause and 
effect relation, between Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease and 
her decision to have a transplantation. Her kidney disease 
did not operate physiologically to cause her decision to have 
a transplantation.43 Her decision was caused by an 
independent act of volition. The causal connection 
identified by Judge Cornaby, a simple "but for" relation, is 
insufficient to establish "material contributing cause" under 
the Oregon interpretation. 
The second part of Judge Cornaby's sequence suffers from 
the same problem - a factor other than an active 
physiological cause produces the effect. Judge Cornaby 
states: "If she had not had the kidney transplant, she would 
not have been given steroid drugs . . . ."44 Again, the "but 
for" causal relation is apparent. It is nonsensical, 
however, to say that the transplantation "caused" the 
administration of steroid drugs in the causal sense 
recognized by the Oregon courts as that necessary to 
establish "material contributing cause." 
42 ^ 
4 3
 Affidavit of Dr. Wayne A. Border f 9 (R. 28). 
4 4
 Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 (R. 89). 
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That Judge Cornaby did not recognize the lack of a 
physiological cause and effect relation in the present matter 
is somewhat confusing in light of the fact that he did 
recognize the relation in the following supposed analogies: 
"As a practical matter, patients do not die from their 
underlying illness; arteriosclerosis victims die of cardiac 
arrest and AIDS victims die of pneumonia, yet in those cases, 
the common perception of the resulting death is the 
underlying disease."45 In other words, although a perceived 
cause of death may be a certain event, often an underlying 
disease can also be correctly termed a "cause" of death 
because of a direct physiological causal link between the 
underlying disease and the event.46 
Although Judge Cornaby stated that this situation is 
analogous to the sequence of events leading to Mrs. 
Draughon's death, the analogy only holds true if one begins 
the sequence with Mrs. Draughon's pancreatitis. That is, 
although the pancreatitis was the "common perception of the 
resulting death," Mrs. Draughon died of cardiac arrest.47 
4 5
 Id. 
4 6
 For example, the underlying disease arteriosclerosis 
causes a thickening and hardening of arterial walls, which in 
turn causes restricted and, eventually, blocked circulation, 
which in turn causes the event cardiac arrest. 
4 7
 Deposition transcript of Dr. Wayne A. Border at 31. 
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The analogy fails if the sequence begins with Mrs. Draughon's 
kidney disease because of the lack of physiological 
causation. 
In short, the lack of physiological causation compels 
the conclusion that Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was not a 
"material contributing cause" of her death. In reaching the 
opposite result, Judge Cornaby misconstrued and misapplied 
the Oregon interpretation and thereby erred. 
CONCLUSION 
The sole issue before Judge Cornaby was whether Sandra 
Draughon/s kidney disease was a "material contributing cause" 
of her death. The analysis necessary to decide the issue had 
two facets - the determination of the meaning of the phrase 
and the application of that meaning to the facts. 
In determining that an Oregon interpretation of the 
phrase provided the relevant meaning, Judge Cornaby 
implicitly decided that the phrase is not ambiguous. Mr. 
Draughon assigns its first error to this decision. Lacking 
any relevant definition, the phrase should have been found 
ambiguous and, pursuant to the rules of construction, it 
should have been construed against its drafter, CUNA. Mr. 
Draughon requests that this court reverse Judge Cornaby's 
ruling dated April 9, 1987, on the grounds that the phrase is 
ambiguous and should have been construed in favor of Mr. 
28 
Draughon pursuant to the construction urged below and on 
appeal. 
Mr. Draughon next assigns error to Judge Cornaby's 
decision to apply the Oregon interpretation of the phrase to 
the facts of this case. The legal and factual setting of the 
present matter does not conform with that in which the Oregon 
courts apply the phrase. Furthermore, the parties did not 
intend that the phrase be construed according to an Oregon 
interpretation. Mr. Draughon requests that this court find 
the Oregon interpretation inapplicable and, on that basis, 
reverse Judge Cornaby's ruling dated April 9, 1987. 
Mr. Draughon's third assignment of error involves the 
construction of the Oregon interpretation by Judge Cornaby 
and the application of that construction to the facts. Judge 
Cornaby failed to perceive the nature of the causal 
connection essential to the Oregon interpretation of the 
phrase. As a result, he misconstrued the Oregon 
interpretation and misapplied it to the facts. Assuming this 
court finds the Oregon interpretation applicable, Mr. 
Draughon requests (1) that it find that properly construed 
and applied, the Oregon interpretation mandates a finding in 
his favor; and that (2) on the basis of its misconstruction 
and application, Judge Cornaby committed reversible error. 
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DATED: August 2*v. 1987. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
A ^\^^\,^« 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District ::TJJIV-.H-" 
IN AND FOR THE 1307 APR 10 RJ 3: 55 
County of Davis, State of U t a h ^^v^^.W™ 
3 Y _ _ . A / t . _ l _ _ 
RON DRAUGHON, ) 
Plaintiff, ) RULING ON MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. ) 
CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY, ) Civil No. 39545 
Defendant. ) 
The plaintiff's and defendant's motions for summary judgment 
came before the Court on March 31, 1987. The plaintiff was 
represented by Craig G. Adamson and the defendant was represented 
by Lewis B. Quigley. After oral argument, the Court took the 
motions under advisement. The court now rules on the motions for 
summary judgment. 
The material facts in this matter are undisputed. Mrs. 
Sandra Draughon suffered from kidney disease first diagnosed in 
1982. The condition was successfully treated with maintenance 
hemodialysis and, aside from normal side effects of the 
hemodialysis, Mrs. Draughon led a normal, productive life. 
In October of 1985, the plaintiff and Mrs. Draughon, now 
deceased, entered into a loan agreement under which they borrowed 
funds to purchase an automobile through America First Credit 
Union in Ogden, Utah. As part of that transaction the America 
First Credit Union obtained credit life insurance from defendant 
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society for the benefit of the plaintiff 
and his wife. 
In November of 1985, Mrs. Draughon elected to undergo a 
kidney transplant operation, which if successful, would allow her 
to live free of hemodialysis and its side effects. Complications 
FILMED 
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arose following the operation, requiring Mrs. Draughon to remain 
hospitalized until her death on February 7, 1987. She developed 
acute pancreatitis, resulting from steroid drugs required as an 
immunosuppressive. Pancreatitis is a rare and uncommon, 
infrequent complication of taking steroids and was not a foreseen 
complication of which Mrs. Draughon was advised prior to 
undergoing surgery, yet was the ultimate cause of her death. 
Plaintiff submitted a claim to CUNA Mutual Insurance Society 
under the life insurance policy obtained as described above. 
Defendant denied the claim, stating that the death of Sandra L. 
Draughon came under the "risks not assumed" clause of the policy. 
Given these undisputed facts, the legal issue remains: 
Whether Mrs. Draughonfs death resulted from factors which fall 
within the "risks not assumed" clause of the insurance policy. 
The clause states, in pertinent part: 
CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and no 
benefit is provided for any loss if any material 
contributing cause of loss was from sickness or 
injury which first became manifest prior to the 
time insurance coverage was otherwise effective 
under the Contract. 
Interpreting this clause in light of the facts requires that 
the Court determine whether Mrs. Draughon*s kidney disease, which 
existed at the effective date of the insurance contract, was a 
"material contributing cause" of her death. 
This phrase has not been interpreted by a Utah Court before 
arid there is little precedent in other jurisdictions on this 
exact issue. The Appeals Court of Oregon addressed the issue in 
Manous vs. Argonaut Insurance, 79 Or.App. 645, 719 P. 2d 1318 
(1986). This case interpreted the phrase "material contributing 
cause" in light of Oregon's workmen's compensation law. Under 
this law, the employee has the burden of proving that an original 
injury is a "material contributing cause" of a present 
compensable injury. The court stated that "a compensable injury 
need not be the sole or principal cause of claimant's worsened 
A-3 
condition," it need only be a material cause. id. at 1320. 
Although other intervening forces act upon the original 
condition, the original condition is a material contributing 
factor of the final injury. 
Applying this interpretation to the present facts, kidney 
disease was a "material contributing cause" of Mrs. Draughon1s 
death. If not for her kidney disease, Mrs. Draughon would not 
have elected to undergo a kidney transplant. If she had not had 
the kidney transplant, she would not have been given steroid 
drugs which caused acute pancreatitis, which ultimately caused 
her death. The original condition was kidney disease, which was 
a material factor in causing her death. 
Acute pancreatitis resulting from a kidney transplant cannot 
be equated with intervening factors such as an automobile 
striking a cancer patient walking to the hospital to receive 
radiation therapy. In such a case, it is clear that the cancer 
would not be a "material contributing cause" of the patient's 
death. 
As a practical matter, patients often do not die from their 
underlying illness; arteriosclerosis victims die of cardiac 
arrest and AIDS victims die of pneumonia, yet in those cases, the 
common perception of the resulting death is the underlying 
disease. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Fuller vs. Director of Finance, 
694 p.2d 1045 (Utah 1985), stated: 
In interpreting insurance policies, we have held 
that ambiguities are to be construed against the in-
surer and that words are to be given their ordinary 
meaning. An insured is entitled to the broadest pro-
tection reasonably understood to be provided by the 
policy. 
The plaintiff and his now deceased wife entered into the 
life insurance contract less than one month prior to Mrs. 
Draughon!s kidney transplant, which she had been considering for 
some time. It seems reasonable that upon interpreting the "risks 
A-4 
not assumed" clause, the plaintiff reasonably understood that it 
included Mrs, Draughon's kidney disease and any complications 
arising out of a transplant operation related to that disease. 
The ordinary meaning of the phrase "material contributing cause" 
has been applied to the facts underlying the plaintiff's claim, 
which CUNA Mutual Insurance Society properly denied. 
No genuine issues of material fact exist, therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 56 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant's 
motion for judgment is granted. Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
Dated April 9, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Craig G. Adamson, 310 
South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and Lewis B. 
Quigley, Suite 133 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101 en April 10, 1987. 
tici fdiXty? 
Deputy Clerk 
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AFFIDAVIT OF DR. 
WAYNE A. BORDER 
C i v i l No. 39545 
C r a i g G. Adamson
 M , r u»n c Al LPHiH.CLEBK 
E r i c P . Lee M , C H 2 ' i p s T W C T COURT 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f
 (kn mm 
310 South Main, Suite 13 3 0 BY •^PtnTaiRK 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
RON DRAUGHON, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dr. Wayne A. Border, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states: 
1. I have personal knowledge of all facts stated in this 
affidavit. 
2. I am Chief of the Division of Nephrology and 
Hypertension at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
3. I was Sandra L. Draughon1s last attending physician 
before her death on February 7, 1986. Dr. Martin C. Gregory was 
her attending physician at the time of death. 
4. Mrs. Draughon suffered from chronic renal failure due to 
1 
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reflux nephropathy (kidney disease) first diagnosed in September 
of 1982. 
5. This condition was successfully treated with maintenance 
hemodialysis. In fact, Mrs. Draughon did remarkably well on 
hemodialysis and lead a normal, productive life including full 
employment. She could have continued with this treatment 
indefinitely. 
6. In November of 1985, Mrs. Draughon elected to undergo a 
kidney transplant operation. The operation was successfully 
performed on November 21, 1985. 
7. Following the operation, Mrs. Draughon developed acute 
pancreatitis, an unusual complication of kidney transplant 
operations and immunosuppressive treatment. Ultimately, this 
complication, not her kidney disease, caused Mrs. Draughon's 
death. 
8. The pancreatitis developed by Mrs. Draughon was in no 
way related to her kidney disease. 
9. Mrs. Draughon's decision to undergo a kidney 
transplantation was purely elective and not necessitated by the 
presence of kidney disease. Thus, her death caused by 
pancreatitis following the surgery was in no way connected with 
her pre-existing condition. 
2 
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DATED this ^>Q day of December, 1986. 
C 1 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
WaynerA. Border, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jfc — day of 
December, 1986, 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary P u b l i c / > . * , /J,-/• /Jf~/ 
R e s i d i n g a t : •\ZjL<lf <2A^Z<- L/Zif; (AJ&U 
draughon.aff 
A-8 
FILFC PI C>.Wz OrFICF 
Lewis B. Quigley, USB No. 2669 
Matthew J. Storey, USB No. 4678 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RON DRAUGHON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. ROBERT E. BOND 
Civil No. 39545 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
SS, 
Having been first duly sworn, Affiant deposes and says: 
1. I am a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State 
of Utah, specializing in internai medicine and nephrology. 
2. I presently serve as Chief of Nephrology, LDS Hospital. 
3. I have reviewed the medical records of Mrs. Sandra Draughon 
pertaining to her kidney disease and death in February of 1986. These 
records contain the following information: 
(a) Mrs. Draughon was a 33 year old woman with end-stage 
renal disease, secondary to chronic reflux pyelonephritis. 
(b) She was admitted to the University of Utah Hospital 
on November 21, 1985, for placement of a cadaveric renal graft. 
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(c) She developed acute rejection of the graft and a 
transplant nephrectomy was performed approximately one week 
after the initial transplant. 
(d) An abdominal exploration at the time of the kidney 
transplant showed hemorrhagic pancreatitis to be present and 
from that time on she had multiple problems and complications 
secondary to infections and hemorrhagic pancreatitis that 
ultimately led to her death in early February of 1986. 
(e) She received Prednisone in conjunction with her 
transplant operation. 
4. Administration of Prednisone in high doses can lead to acute 
pancreatitis. 
5. Pancreatitis is an uncommon, but not unknown complication 
associated with kidney transplantation. ^ / 
6. Pancreatitis was a complication that'^occurred as a result 
of the treatment that was done for Sandra Draughon's primary under-
lying renal disease. 
7. Pancreatitis is an uncommon complication of kidney trans-
plantation. Pancreatitis was a-complication that in all probability 
occurred as a result of the treatment that was done for Sandra 
Draughon's primary, underlying disease. 
8. It is extremely unlikely that Mrs. Draughon would have 
developed acute pancreatitis had not the transplant surgery been 
done and the transplant surgery was done because of her renal disease. 
DATED this fg/i day of 7 ^ ^ ^ # 1987. 
1
 sT/C**r *? 2?<mJ. w o. 
ROBERT E. BOND, M.D. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e me by ROBERT E. BOND, M . D . , t h i s 
/ / • ^ d a y of 3 ? < ^ ^ , 1987 . 
/ 
S:< 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing atj; y.y S>; •r>v 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of March, 1987, I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DR. ROBERT E. 
BOND, postage prepaid, to the attorney for Plaintiff: 
Mr. Craig G. Adamson 
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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